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Introduction  
Recent financial press commentary paints a positive picture for Ireland’s future. The tenth review by the 
European Union/European Central Bank/International Monetary Fund (EU/ECB/IMF - the Troika) of 
Ireland’s progress concludes that: the gradual recovery is continuing and there have been further 
improvements in market conditions for the sovereign debt problem and the banks.  Ireland has earned 
the nickname of the ‘poster boy for austerity’ for adhering to the Programme of Support from the Troika 
(Halpin and Papachristou, 2013). Ireland became the first Eurozone country to slide into recession In 
September 2008 with economic activity at its weakest in a quarter of a century (Smith, 2008). Now 
Ireland looks to become the first country to exit an EU-led bailout (Horta e Costa,  2013). There are 
differing views on this success.   
“Ireland is setting standards and what has been done has been huge by any standards. More than two-
thirds of the work has been done in terms of fiscal policies.”  
      (Lagarde, 2013) 
 
There has been heavy reliance on this external financial assistance programme, strict compliance with 
its terms and accompanying large cuts in public expenditure. The gravity of the situation has created an 
arena where financial cutbacks and austerity dominate.  
“Like some terrible World War 1 conflict, we have sacrificed millions of lives to gain a metre of ground.  
Austerity is not working”.   
 (Begg, 2013) 
 
While there is evidence of some public sector reform progress there is also evidence of limited 
substantive reform to date. The financial straitjacket imposed by the EU/ECB/IMF agreement is a 
fundamental constraint on the actions of the State.  However, the straitjacket provides legitimating 
support for government’s programme of cutbacks in public services and new taxes. Nevertheless, as 
noted above, there is a mixed response to government attempts to rationalize its public services.  The 
Government noted in its public sector reform programme that placing customer service at the heart of 
government is its focus (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2011, p.3 ). However, the 
Government’s claim to place the citizen at the centre of public sector reform efforts is somewhat 
disingenuous in view of funding cuts in health, education, social services and policing. 
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The corner has been turned in financial terms – the cost of issuing new government bonds has fallen and 
there have been some improvements in GDP growth rates.  This paper sets out in the following sections 
the response of the Irish government to the impact of the financial crisis in the Eurozone.  It focuses on 
the impacts of the Government response in shaping the future economic health of the country.  The 
paper does not consider wider socioeconomic impacts of the actions of government – those are for 
future studies when these impacts are clear.  The paper is structured as follows:  a conceptual 
framework, the crisis, where we are now, public management reforms, budgets (cuts, cuts, cuts), and a 
conclusions section.   
Conceptual framework  
Ireland is not alone in needing to make cutbacks.  Other countries in the Eurozone area are faced with 
various fiscal and financial crisis.  Fiscal crises culminate at a point that require decisions about cutbacks 
that are both politically sensitive and unpopular (Kickert, 2012).  In Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy 
national governments in their strategies of retrenchment failed to connect cutback management to 
ambitious administrative modernization programmes (Di Mascio and Natalini, 2013). Cutback 
management  involves a choice between equity and efficiency concerns in choosing decision rules to 
allocate the cuts (Levine, 1978).  There is a tension here between old style public administration values 
and those of the new public management (NPM) that gives different prominence to these two values. 
The pressure for cutbacks can come from two sources: external pressures or politicians’ ideological 
convictions on the need for change (Dunsire and Hood, 1989).  There is belief that financial and staffing 
pressures on public sector organisations will make them fitter, leaner and more efficient (Dunsire and 
Hood, 1989, p.186).  Evolving control frameworks under NPM are weakening the priority given to equity 
concerns in policy design and implementation (Denhardt, 2004).  A market-led approach to the business 
of government and the subsequent discharge of accountability solely in efficiency, effectiveness and 
responsiveness terms is considered deficient as a measure of accountability (Denhardt and Denhardt, 
2000; Bardouille, 2000). This conflict between social democratic considerations and the drive for 
efficiencies is at the heart of recent debates over public sector management reforms.  Suleiman (2003) 
suggests that NPM ideas aimed at addressing weaknesses in traditional bureaucracies in the pursuit of 
efficiency serve to undermine democracy itself.  A concern with cutback management is the threat to 
the social contract – job security and other values – and the consequences of this for employee 
motivation (Pandey, 2010) as governments aim to reduce the size of public sectors. In the case of 
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Ireland, cutbacks have become necessary because of a crisis with multiple causes.  The primary cause of 
the crisis and assistance secured to address it is examined in the next section.  
 
The crisis 
On the last day of September 2008 the six domestic banks received government guarantees on all 
deposits and specific debt instruments until September 2010 subsequently extended until its removal on 
28
th
 March 2013 (Honohan, 2009, Oireachtas, 2008).  As the government struggled to recapitalize the 
banks the cost of government borrowing reached unsustainable highs - 14% in July 2011. For a more 
detailed review of the banking crisis, the sustainability of Irish debt and the fiscal policies that 
contributed to the crisis, see:  Honohan (2010), Regling and Watson (2010), Bergin et al. (2011), McHale 
(2012) and Kane (2012).  In November 2010 the Irish government formally sought external financial 
help. An €85 billion financial assistance programme was approved by the IMF in liaison with the ECB and 
European Commission (EU/ECB/IMF, 2010, p.8) in December 2010. The €85 billion Programme for 
Support involves €67.5 billion of external assistance and €17.5 billion of funds to be generated internally 
(see Table 1 below).  This €67.5bn is a loan which must be repaid in full with interest.  
 Table 1: EU/ECB/IMF Programme of Financial Support  
  billion billion 
External European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) €22.5  €67.5 
 IMF Extended Fund Facility €22.5  
 European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and bilateral 
loans from the UK, Sweden and Denmark  
 
€22.5 
 
    
Internal National Pension Reserve Fund and other domestic 
cash resources 
€17.5 €17.5 
 
 Total   €85.0  
 Source:   EU/ECB/IMF (2010) 
 
The programme provided for up to €50bn in fiscal needs and up to €35bn in banking support measures 
between 2011 and the end of 2013. The programme requires actions to address fiscal consolidation, 
financial sector reforms, and structural reforms.  Structural reforms are aimed at resource conservation 
and improving competition to drive economic recovery. These changes have had a range of impacts 
which will be reviewed in the next two sections.  
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Where we are now  
 
In this section the impact of the crisis on: economic growth, the extent of and cost of government 
borrowing, the government surplus/deficit and migration is explored.  Gross Domestic Product in Ireland 
(at constant market prices) increased in 2011, for the first time in four years (see Table 2).  Having 
peaked in 2007, the GDP growth rate was negative for the next three years.  In 2011 the GDP growth 
rate was positive again at 1.6 per cent and marginally positive in 2012. However, on a seasonally 
adjusted basis, GDP (at constant market prices) for the fourth quarter of 2012 showed almost no change 
compared with the previous quarter and GDP decreased 0.6% in the first quarter of 2013 as compared 
with quarter four of 2012 (Central Statistics Office, 2013a).  
 
Table 2: Irish GDP and GDP Growth Rates 2005-2011 
Year GDP Growth in GDP  % 
2005 163.0 8.5 
2006 177.7 9.0 
2007 188.7 6.2 
2008 178.9 -5.2 
2009 161.3 -9.8 
2010 156.5 -2.9 
2011 159.0 +1.6 
2012 160.2 +0.9 
  Source: Central Statistics Office (2012a, p.17-18) and (2013b). 
 
 
General government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP in Ireland declined from 31.9 per 
cent to 24.8 per cent over the 2002-2007 period but then increased steeply in 2008 to 44.2 per cent. The 
debt to GDP ratio has continued to increase strongly year-on-year since 2008 to stand at 117.6% of GDP 
by the end of 2012.  The steep rise in this government debt to GDP ratio reflects two things:  declining 
GDP in the years 2008 to 2010 and only modest growth in GDP since then as shown in Table 2; and 
additional borrowing annually as Government continues to spend more than it collects in taxes, thereby 
giving rise to the need to borrow to finance annual current expenditure.  Ireland had the third highest 
debt to GDP ratio in the EU in 2011 behind Greece and Italy. The Eurozone 17 debt to GDP  per cent over 
the period 2002 to 2008 remained close to 70 per cent before rising over the last three years to stand at 
87.2 per cent in 2011 (Eurostat, 2011). It is anticipated that Ireland’s debt/GDP ratio will peak at 120.3 
per cent in 2013 before falling to 117.4 per cent in 2015 (Department of  Finance, 2012).   Table 3 shows 
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Ireland’s deficit has been declining as a percentage of GDP.   For 2011 it was 9.4 per cent well below the 
EU/ECB/IMF Programme target for 2011 of 10.6 per cent (Department of  Finance, 2012). EU/ECB/IMF 
Programme targets were also reached in 2012. 
 
 
 
  Table 3: Deficit as a percentage of GDP  
Year %    actual / target 
2009 11.5 actual 
2010 10.9 actual 
2011   9.4 actual (target 10.6%) 
2012  7.6 actual (target 8.6%) 
2013  7.5 budget 
2014  4.8 budget 
2015  2.8 budget 
                             Source: Central Statistics Office (2012a) and (Eurostat, 2013). 
 
The cost of funding public services has also been affected.  The yield on Irish government bonds is now 
at a level 3.8 per cent having peaked at 14 per cent in mid-2011 (Hancock, 2013). There was a more 
pronounced decline in yields on shorter maturities (National Treasury Management Agency, 2012, p.9). 
This decline in bond yields strengthens the State’s chances of a full return to the bond markets and 
emerging from the bailout programme in late 2013 without requiring further significant financial 
support.    
 
Net migration statistics form a part of the Irish crisis story.  Numbers emigrating from Ireland started to 
increase sharply from 2005 and numbers leaving Ireland have continued to increase (see Table 4) thus 
masking a bigger problem in unemployment statistics since 2009. Unemployment was 6.4% in 2008 and 
had increased to 14.7% in 2012 although preliminary seasonally adjusted numbers for 2013 show an 
improvement at 13.7% (Central Statistics Office, 2013b).  Emigration in any single year in the previous 
ten years had not exceeded 31,500 people with average emigration of 28,400 people in the ten years to 
2004.  In contrast, the number of immigrants peaked in 2007 and fell sharply for the next three years to 
reflect a more typical pattern of 50,700 immigrants on average per annum over the ten years prior to 
2004.  
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             Table 4:       Net Migration Ireland 2004 – 2012 (000s) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Immigration  58.5 84.6 107.8 151.1 113.5 73.7 41.8 53.3 52.7 
Emigration 26.5 29.4 36.0 46.3 49.2 72.0 69.2 80.6 87.1 
Net 32 55.1 71.8 104.8 64.3 1.6 -27.5 -27.4 -34.4 
            Source:  Central Statistics Office (2012b, Table 1 ) 
 
However, further analysis of emigration statistics shows that Irish people emigrating accounted for less 
than 50% of total emigration until 2011 (52.1%) see Table 5 (Central Statistics Office, 2012b).  From 2006 
to 2012 other Europeans accounted for large numbers of emigrants from Ireland. 
 
             Table 5:         Migration from Ireland by Nationality 2006-1012  
 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Irish  42.5% 26.7% 41.8% 53.4% 
EU-27 40.3% 54.9% 44.8% 33.9% 
Rest of World 17.2% 18.4% 13.4% 12.7% 
Total  36,000 49,000 69,200 87,100 
 
Central Statistic Office numbers show that the number of Europeans emigrating between 2006 and 2008 
almost doubled and stayed at this level for the next four years reflecting the departure of many Eastern 
Europeans who had come to work in the construction and other sectors in the boom years.  The impact 
of the crisis on  economic and financial indicators and also on the human pattern of migration occurred 
alongside efforts to reform as well as to reduce the cost of public services.     
 
Public sector expenditure reduction and reform  
In this section the impact of the crisis on public sector workers incomes, public service capacity, state 
assets and the opportunity for public sector reform is examined.  Existing public sector workers have 
endured pay cuts with harsher cuts to be imposed on new recruits to the public sector - a clear instance 
of the equity/efficiency tension in cutback management choices as noted earlier by Levine (1978).  
Future recruits to the public sector may respond negatively to this reduced benefits contract – a concern 
raised by Pandey (2010).  In March 2009, a pension levy of 7 per cent on average was applied to the  
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earnings of public servants (other than judges) (Oireachtas, 2009).  In addition, a reduction in rates of 
pay and allowances took effect on January 1
st
 2010, and combined with the pension levy, resulted in an 
effective average reduction of 14 per cent in salaries of existing public sector staff as well as a pay freeze 
until 2014 (Irish Government, 2010b, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, 2011, Oireachtas, 2009).   
In June 2010, against a background of private sector wage cuts and redundancies, the government and 
public sector unions reached an agreement aimed at wide ranging reform of the public sector, increased 
flexibility and redeployment and reduced headcount on a voluntary basis. This Public Service Agreement 
2010-2014 (Croke Park 1) is an agreement between the Irish Government and the Committee of the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions which represents public sector workers to work together to change the way in 
which public services are managed and delivered so that both the cost of public services and the 
number of people working in the public service will fall significantly, yet continue to meet the need for 
services and improve the experience of service users.  A national implementation body was established 
in July 2010 and is responsible for overseeing, driving and verifying progress on the implementation of 
the Croke Park Agreement across the public service and for the resolution of issues as they arise.  In late 
June 2013 Croke Park 2, (also known as the Haddington Road Agreement) was agreed (Irish 
Government, 2013).  This involved a further pay cut (of 5.5%) for public servants earning more than 
€65,000 per annum on their full salary and other measures aimed at delivering €1bn in further savings 
by 2016.  Salary cuts increase progressively to the point of a 10% marginal reduction for those earning 
more than €185,000.  An earlier version of this agreement had been rejected in Spring 2013. After the 
rejection of the Croke Park 2 Agreement by public sector trade unions, the Government passed 
emergency legislation which allowed it to impose pay cuts on higher earners (salaries greater than 
€65,000), suspend increments, and alter the terms and conditions of public sector workers for public 
service groups that decided not to sign up to Croke Park 2 (Oireachtas, 2013).  The General Secretary of 
the Civil Public and Services Union noted that:  
members had been left with ‘Hobson's Choice’ over the deal and that... the result could not be seen as an 
endorsement of the Haddington Road Agreement, but rather as a result forced by Government through intimidation 
and fear. 
He noted that:   
the passing of emergency legislation, with draconian ministerial powers to change the conditions of Government 
employees, had left members with a gun to their heads. 
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The Unite Union regional secretary at the biennial conference of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
described attacks on working people as a “war”, whilst at the same Congress union staff representing 
the Irish Nurses and Midwives union said that: 
the Labour Party [coalition partners in government] must be told it could not leave power with the financial 
emergency legislation still on the statute books to be used as a weapon of mass destruction against workers by a 
future administration (Wall, 2013b). 
 
A key objective of the Croke Park Agreements is to avoid the scale of industrial unrest which 
characterized Ireland in the 1980s.  There have been indications of this in recent press reports (Wall, 
2013a, Halpin, 2013).    
Historically, Ireland has been slow to adopt public sector reforms although this changed somewhat with 
codification of NPM ideas in legislation which supported implementation of NPM principles under the 
Strategic Management Initiative in Ireland from the mid 1990s (Robbins and Lapsley, 2005).  In a speech 
at the 15
th
 International Research Society for Public Management Conference the newly elected Minster 
for Public Service Reform noted in April 2011 that there was now an opportunity to radically change 
what we do in the public service and that parts of the public sector are not fit for purpose and need 
reform (Minister for Public Expenditure Reform - Brendan Howlin, 2011).  The newly formed 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform established by legislation on July 6
th
 2011 is responsible 
for reducing public expenditure and leading public service reform under the terms of the Croke Park 
Agreement. Expenditure and reform in the title of the new Department convey a commitment by this 
Government to interlink these two elements. The Department of Public Expenditure and Reform and all 
government departments carried out comprehensive expenditure reviews (CERs) in 2011.  These and 
future CERs are intended to become “the keystone of financial management” (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2012a, p.12).  
Since 2009, public sector workers have experienced cuts in salaries, cuts in staff numbers and signed 
two Public Service Agreements aimed at maintaining a stable industrial relations environment.  In 
tandem with reductions in public service staff numbers, the newly formed Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform has planned a programme of reform based on: a renewed focus on customer 
service, maximizing new and innovative service delivery channels, radically reducing costs to drive better 
value for money, organizing in new ways and increasing the focus on implementation and delivery 
(Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2011, p.3 ).  
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The Irish government has stayed firmly within guidelines adhering to the budget reduction terms of the 
EU/ECB/IMF bailout with a consequent reduction in public services, particularly health services.  Ten of 
eleven quarterly reviews have taken place as of August 2013 and satisfactory progress has been 
reported (International Monetary Fund, 2012).  Whilst public sector reform is an element of the reform 
package it appears that most attention has been on budgetary reductions with consequent decreases in 
organizational capacity.  The range and quality of public services have been affected and reductions in 
budgets have been keenly felt in health and education. For instance, there has been in excess of a 12  
per cent reduction over the three year period 2008 and 2011 of home help hours for an increasing 
number of primarily elderly, but also disabled citizens (Health Service Executive, 2011, Table 14).  In the 
overall health sector staff numbers are required to decrease by 12.2% (net reduction of 12,400 staff) to 
achieve budgetary targets. To date net reductions of 10,000 staff have been made, many of these front 
line staff (Health Service Executive, 2013).  Government policy statements articulating a renewed focus 
on customer service is at odds with the public’s experience of policy impacts of cutbacks such as these – 
a case of inconsistency between policy and practice. This reduced service for vulnerable sections of the 
population raises concerns about equity and efficiency trade-offs, a concern raised by Denhardt (2004).  
The primacy of financial cutbacks is explained further in the next section.  
Budgets – cuts, cuts, cuts 
A National Recovery Plan was published in November 2010.  It outlined actions to implement a fiscal 
policy aimed at maintaining a government deficit at not more than 3% of GDP in line with the Stability 
and Growth Pact – the agreement between European member states to protect the European Economic 
and Monetary Union.  The recovery plan included a €15 billion budgetary adjustment over the four year 
period 2011-2014.  Budget 2011 (delivered in December 2010) was the first phase of implementation of 
this plan. Two-thirds of the adjustment (€10 billion) was to come from expenditure cuts, with one third 
(€5 billion) expected to be generated from increased government revenues.  The public service pay bill 
had already been reduced by €1.4 billion in 2009 as a result of pay cuts and a pension levy now paid by 
employees.  This was the first reduction in public sector pay since 1933 (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2012b).  As with the cuts in expenditure, on the revenue raising side forty per 
cent of the adjustment was frontloaded to the first year of the plan - 2011. On the revenue raising side 
the focus was on broadening the tax base, as in 2010, forty-five per cent of tax units paid no income tax 
(Irish Government, 2010a, p.89).  
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Budget 2011 delivered in December 2010 consisted primarily of the pay cuts outlined earlier for public 
servants, cuts in social protection payments and cuts in capital expenditure. Budget 2012 and 2013 
consisted of a combination of increased taxation measures including a new property tax and cuts in 
funding for public services. Cuts in funding for health services for instance included: reductions in 
numbers of health service staff under the Employment Control Framework, savings in procurement, and 
savings in prescription drug payments through greater prescribing of generic drugs. Cuts in education 
included: cuts in capitation grants across a range of further and adult education courses, reduction in 
the student maintenance grant, and a reduction in the fund for students with disabilities.  
 
Conclusions 
As noted by Dunsire and Hood (1989) the pressure for cutbacks may come from two sources.  In 
advance of the request for external financial assistance from Europe the Irish government had already 
embarked on a series of cutbacks in three budgets during the fourteen months to December 2009.  
Further cutbacks came at the insistence of the Troika.  Whilst in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy 
national governments in their strategies of retrenchment failed to connect cutback management to 
ambitious administrative modernization programmes (Di Mascio and Natalini, 2013), the response of 
the Irish Government was to prioritize cutbacks in public services and new taxes. The newly elected 
government (February 2011) established the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform in July 2011. 
The Cabinet Committee responsible for reviewing progress on the Public Sector Reform Plan consists of 
the most senior politicians and civil servants.  The extent of public sector reform in its rationalization 
programme is distinct. In the Public Service Reform Plan issues of efficiency are raised nine times while 
equity is not mentioned at all.  The discharge of accountability solely in efficiency, effectiveness and 
responsiveness terms is considered deficient as a measure of accountability (Denhardt and Denhardt, 
2000; Bardouille, 2000). Suleiman (2003) suggests that NPM ideas aimed at addressing weaknesses in 
traditional bureaucracies in the pursuit of efficiency serve to undermine democracy itself. Whilst equity 
as a concern is not mentioned, democratic accountability concerns are considered six times in the 
reform plan indicating some sense of balance between managerial accountability and efficiency 
concerns on the one hand and democratic considerations on the other.  However, whilst public sector 
reform has received some attention, the primary focus of government and civil servants has been on 
adherence to the EU/ECB/IMF programme. 
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Fiscal imbalances in Ireland, as elsewhere, have required cutbacks that have proven unpopular (Kickert, 
(2012).  There are potential consequences arising from this element of cutback management in terms of 
employee motivation and commitment (Pandey, 2010).  Net migration, since 2009, masks a larger 
unemployment problem. Evidence was provided earlier in the paper of the growing disquiet voiced at 
the biennial Irish Congress of Trade Union conference at salary cuts, changes in terms of employment 
and other public service cutbacks which impact on the organizational capacity of the public sector.  
The EU/ECB/IMF bailout has come at a cost of reduced sovereign control.  The loss of control of the Irish 
government over its own budgetary policy was highlighted in November 2011 when details of the Irish 
National Budget for 2012 were discussed by the Bundestag’s Budget Committee in advance of being 
discussed in the Irish parliament.  The Irish Budget 2012 blueprint had been given to the German 
Finance Ministry as part of the agreed quarterly reviews of Ireland’s €85bn Troika Programme of 
Support.  EU/ECB/IMF oversight will continue for years after Ireland exits the Programme of Support.  
Oversight of the country’s budget will be a permanent feature under the EU’s new regulations following 
the near collapse of the euro. 
There are some positive developments.  Compared with other Eurozone countries there is relative 
political stability in Ireland since the current government enjoys a substantial majority in Parliament. The 
second public service agreement has been reached, albeit after the threat of emergency legislation to 
facilitate implementation of salary cuts if it was not agreed. This second agreement contains the word 
stability in its title denoting the importance of industrial relations stability to facilitate economic 
recovery.  These aspects of stability assist in boosting confidence in Ireland’s economic future. 
Unemployment statistics for 2013 show an improvement for the first time in five years, although this 
masks growing net emigration numbers. Investor confidence has grown as evidenced by the decline in 
yields on long and short term Government bonds.  Recent short-term and long-term bond offerings have 
been oversubscribed indicating a renewed interest and demand for Irish sovereign debt, which augurs 
well for future fundraising efforts as Ireland prepares to exit the Programme of Financial Support. 
Structural reforms are focused on maintaining flexibility in the labour market and enhancing 
competitiveness. Growth in economic activity depends on the availability of cheap finance to fuel 
economic demand.  However, Ireland’s economic fortunes depend in large part on revival of trading 
partner growth which recently (2013) has halted the faltering progress Ireland was making on GDP 
growth. 
13 
 
The Department of Public Expenditure and Reform is in its infancy.  Some limited steps have been taken 
to link reforms with cutbacks. The Comprehensive Expenditure Review 2012-2014 implements 
commitments made in the Public Service Reform Plan. However, the focus is on identification of savings 
by reducing both the number of agencies and staff numbers – is this cutbacks or true reform?  A further 
study of the impact of reforms will be needed to examine the influence of reforms on the public service 
experiences of the Irish public as these changes are embedded. The crisis has given Government the 
impetus to downsize the public sector through a range of cutbacks.  The quarterly reviews within “the 
Troika Agreement” provide a framework for addressing long standing problems.  The programme for 
future public service reform is now supported by new fiscal rules, a medium term expenditure 
framework underpinned by a regular comprehensive review process, updated and refocused Value for 
Money Reviews and a move to performance budgeting.   All of these elements have undertones that 
reflect a concern with efficiencies.  Overall, the impact of this Irish austerity programme is a reduction in 
the capacity of the public sector to deliver public services.  The maxim of `more with less` has a hollow 
ring in the context of public management challenges in this environment of austerity. 
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